2022
CRIME CONTROL PLAN

THREE YEAR UPDATE

SALT LAKE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT

2022
CRIME CONTROL PLAN

THREE YEAR UPDATE

VISION

**STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES,
PROMOTING SAFETY, EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES**

CHIEF'S MESSAGE

Addressing the safety of Salt Lake City starts with an acknowledgement of the women and men of the Salt Lake City Police Department. No matter their assignment or rank, they come to work committed to strengthening our neighborhoods, promoting safety and expanding opportunities for the community. From the department's newest officers to our most seasoned, our police department is comprised of people who embody our mission of serving as guardians of our community to preserve life, maintain human rights, protect property, and promote individual responsibility and community commitment. Everything the Salt Lake City Police Department does is geared toward strengthening our community and building and maintaining relationships.

For Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, the Salt Lake City Police Department is authorized 750 total full-time employees. Of those, 594 are sworn members of law enforcement. The department continues its recruitment and hiring efforts for sworn members as well as its professional staff, including social workers and records clinicians. The department's budget for FY23 increased 24.7% from FY22 to $103,944,583 million.

In 2020, the Salt Lake City Police Department launched its first Crime Control Plan (CCP) to address violent crime. The department's CCP continues to evolve and build upon the years prior. We account for our successes and study our areas of opportunities. Since 2020, substantial time and effort has gone into reducing violent crime in the city, yet more work is needed. The 2021 CCP had four overall goals: lowering crime, improving response times, filling funded and unfunded sworn positions and continuing to build community relationships. The department approached its 2021 goals through short-, medium- and long-term strategies.

I am proud of the work we have accomplished in the last two years. Cities across the United States are continuing to grapple with a surge in violent crime, including gun violence and murders. In Salt Lake City, we are pushing forward with new strategies to help ensure the city's future safety for all, including those experiencing homelessness. The SLCPD is engaged in a comprehensive and collaborative approach with many stakeholders to address criminal activity and livability issues. Officers enforce the city's no camping ordinance, but they first prioritize education and work compassionately to provide people resources and advocacy to encourage and support lasting behavioral changes. However, public safety is unique. The criminal justice system today remains much more complex than it did even five years ago. The achievements and failures of the criminal justice system often get placed on law enforcement. To truly embark on a crime reduction plan that will be successful, SLCPD needs support from local government and our community. That is why we continue to rely heavily on our partnership with the United States Attorney's Office in Utah to support Project Safe Neighborhoods. This program is key to coordinating resources and identifying and arresting the most violence-prone individuals within our community.

As a police department, we are committed to relying on data more than ever to focus our attention and resources on crime. The backbone of this year's CCP is the partnership between the Salt Lake City Police Department and the University of Texas at San Antonio and the department's continued and expanded use of Stratified Policing in collaboration with Dr. Roberto Santos and Dr. Rachel Santos. The geographic concentration of violent crime in Salt Lake City is consistent with a large body of literature describing urban crime, particularly violent crime, as a phenomenon primarily occurring in a few small geographic areas. That is why our approach to reducing violence will focus heavily on hot-spot policing; problem-oriented, place-based policing; and focused deterrence. Simultaneously, we continue incorporating the well-researched principles of stratified policing to improve policing services, reducing crime and the harm caused by offenders and maintaining our positive relationship with our community.

MIKE BROWN

CONTINUED FOCUS AND IMPACT AREAS

STAFFING

CRIME REDUCTION

CALLS FOR SERVICE

COMMUNITY LIVABILITY

COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING

HOMELESSNESS

TIMELINE AND STATUS

JANUARY 2021

Iteration #1 of the Salt Lake City Police Department's Crime Control Plan (CCP) is published.

GOAL

To drive overall crime below the five-year average benchmark and to impact violent and property crime in targeted areas that have been identified as spiking.

STATUS: ✓ Ongoing ☐ Achieved ☐ Not Completed

OBJECTIVES	PROGRESS:
• Implement a data-driven, comprehensive approach to address people, places, and behaviors impacting violent crime.	Achieved and ongoing.
• Increase clearance rates and solvability of violent and property crime.	Ongoing.
• Improve coordination and communications within the department and with external partners.	Achieved and ongoing.
• Optimize departmental resources using technology.	Achieved and ongoing.

NOVEMBER 2021

Iteration #2 of the Salt Lake City Police Department's Crime Control Plan is published.

GOALS FOR CRIME CONTROL PLAN #2

Lower crime.

STATUS:	✓	Ongoing	✓	Achieved in part		Not Completed

YEAR TO DATE CITY-WIDE CRIME

January 1 – October 2, 2022

Violent Crime: Down 4.5%

Property Crime: Down 10%

Total Crime: Down 9%

Year-to-Date Totals (Jan 1 through Oct 2)
- Property Crimes
- Violent Crimes

Year	Total
2016	14,223
2017	13,869
2018	10,906
2019	9,914
2020	12,268
2021	12,835
2022	11,632

Improve response times.

STATUS:	✓	Ongoing	✓	Achieved in part		Not Completed

PRIORITY 1-3 RESPONSE TIME AVERAGES

Last 12 Months	Oct-21	Nov-21	Dec-21	Jan-22	Feb-22	Mar-22	Apr-22	May-22	Jun-22	Jul-22	Aug-22	Sep-22
Priority 1 Average	0:14:16	0:12:58	0:10:46	0:10:13	0:10:25	0:10:53	0:11:58	0:10:46	0:12:41	0:11:27	0:11:27	0:10:24
Priority 2 Average	0:25:16	0:20:08	0:16:55	0:16:20	0:16:47	0:16:02	0:17:53	0:17:42	0:20:37	0:17:59	0:19:38	0:15:38
Priority 3 Average	1:19:07	0:50:59	0:35:47	0:32:37	0:37:18	0:36:27	0:42:28	0:46:30	1:06:41	0:58:05	1:00:20	0:42:10
Priority 1-3 Overall Average	0:52:34	0:35:44	0:26:15	0:24:30	0:27:21	0:26:37	0:30:30	0:32:16	0:43:54	0:38:33	0:40:33	0:29:08

Fill funded and unfunded sworn positions.

STATUS: | ✓ | Ongoing | | Achieved | | Not Completed

SEPARATIONS 77 MONTH TRENDLINE - JULY 2016 THROUGH OCTOBER 01, 2022

Continue building community relationships.

STATUS: | ✓ | Ongoing | ✓ | Achieved | | Not Completed

COFFEE WITH A COP

PAY-IT-FORWARD

HISPANIC HERITAGE FESTIVAL

BIKE REGISTRATION

PIZZA WITH THE POLICE

KAVA EVENT

STRATEGIES	PROGRESS:
• Develop the SLCPD Violent Criminal Apprehension Team (V-CAT).	Achieved and ongoing.
• Expand recruitment efforts.	Ongoing with future budget consideration.
• Continuous lateral hiring.	Ongoing.
• Implement Civilian Response Team (CRT)	Ongoing.
• Introduce hiring incentives to include signing bonuses and retention bonuses.	Ongoing with future budget consideration.
• Submit budget amendments (FY22) for additional funding.	Achieved.
• Work with SLC911 Director to expand the current SLCPD Call Diversion Program.	Ongoing.
• Work with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and other criminal justice stakeholders on jail release issues.	Ongoing.
• Work with the Salt Lake County District Attorney on the "High Utilizer Program."	Ongoing.
• Fill funded and unfunded sworn positions.	Ongoing.
• Assess through strategic planning to increase the authorized staffing of the department.	Ongoing.
• Continue Project Safe Neighborhoods commitment with federal partners.	Achieved and ongoing.

OCTOBER 2022

Iteration #3 of the Salt Lake City Police Department's Crime Control Plan is published.

GOALS

Reduce violent crime in Salt Lake City's most violence-prone areas and among the most violence-prone offenders.

Reduce aggregate levels of reported violence city-wide.

STRATEGIES

• Continue the strategies outlined in the second edition of the Salt Lake City Police Department's Crime Control Plan.

• Implement the Salt Lake City Police Department's strategic plan to address violent crime in collaboration with the University of Texas at San Antonio.

• Continue and expand upon the department's use of Stratified Policing in collaboration with Dr. Roberto Santos and Dr. Rachel Santos.

VIOLENT CRIMINAL APPREHENSION TEAM (V-CAT)

CONCEPT · PLANNING · EXECUTION · IMPLEMENTATION · MONITOR · COMPLETE

In FY23, the department will implement a Violent Criminal Apprehension Team (V-CAT). The team will be comprised of one sergeant and nine officers. Members have been selected and the department anticipates moving the selected officers into their positions in November 2022 as the funded positions graduate from the academy and become available for field work.

Funding of the V-CAT is possible through a COPS Hiring grant and city matching funds. The objective of the V-CAT squad will be to specifically address violent crime patterns and repeat violent crime offenders in Salt Lake City. V-CAT will create targeted responses to identify, apprehend and prosecute individuals within our community who engage in violent conduct. The V-CAT will have a citywide span of management and will work with division commanders to address violent crime issues.

IMPACT AREA

10 NEW OFFICERS ADDED TO SLCPD AUTHORIZED STAFFING LEVEL

RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND RETENTION

CONCEPT — PLANNING — EXECUTION — IMPLEMENTATION — MONITOR — COMPLETE

Like police agencies throughout the United States, the Salt Lake City Police Department has struggled with a staffing shortage. As of October 3, 2022, the department is down 41 sworn police officers. In 2022, the SLCPD announced it would provide a $5,000 hiring bonus for lateral officers. Competition for lateral officers in Utah and throughout the United States is enormous. Police agencies in California, Washington, Oregon and New Orleans, among others, have implemented $30-40,000 hiring bonuses paid over time.

RECRUIT CLASS 154
1 Officer in the Field Training Program - Graduation expected February 2022

RECRUIT CLASS 156
20 Officers in the Field Training Program - Graduation expected November 2022

RECRUIT CLASS 158
25 Recruits in the SLCPD Academy - Graduation expected October 2022

RECRUIT CLASS 159
4 Lateral Officers in the Field Training Program - Graduation expected November 2022

RECRUIT CLASS 160
20 Recruits in the SLCPD Academy - Graduation expected March 2023

FEBRUARY	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	MARCH
CLASS 154	CLASS 158	CLASS 156 + 159	CLASS 160

The SLCPD will continue to work with city administration to seek authorization and funding for increasing the department's hiring bonus for all new sworn employees, recruitment, as well as retention bonuses.

In October 2022, the city hired a dedicated recruiter for the police department. The intention is to broaden the scope of recruiting for SLCPD police officer and professional staff positions.

IMPACT AREA

COMMUNITY REESTABLISHMENT AREAS

CONCEPT   PLANNING   EXECUTION   IMPLEMENTATION   MONITOR   COMPLETE

In mid-2020, the SLCPD – as part of our commitment to providing high-quality and community supported police services, launched a formalized and extensive downtown community reestablishment and crime mitigation effort to clean-up the illegal camps, get people inside and into needed services, enforce city and state laws, and to deter criminal activity and illegal camps from re-establishing.

Initially, the department's focus areas included:

- Rio Grande Street – 200 South to 400 South
- 500 West – 200 South to 400 South
- 300 South – 500 West to 600 West
- 600 West South Temple
- 600 West – 1000 West to North Temple

In 2021, the department expanded reestablishment areas to include

- 300 South Main Street
- 200 East 200 South
- 800 West North Temple
- Liberty Park

TIME SPENT BY MITIGATION OT OFFICERS THIS YEAR:

12,333 Hours

FELONY ARRESTS:

216

MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS:

192

Department overtime makes it possible to staff these additional patrol shifts. The department anticipates continuing these shifts into 2023, pending budget approval.

These overtime shifts have allowed officers to increase their presence in the community and have a great impact on public safety. For example: while working an overtime shift, a SLCPD officer stopped a female near Taufer Park. The officer confirmed the woman had felony warrants. During a search incident to arrest, the officer located a loaded handgun and a distributable amount of drugs in the woman's possession.

SLCPD continues to assist the city's Rapid Intervention Team and

the Salt Lake County Health Department on camp abatements. It is the responsibility of the SLCPD to serve as an assisting agency during an abatement.

Another recent success can be found around 300 South and Main Street. Earlier this year, many of the businesses were concerned with the aggressive panhandling occurring in the area. Business owners reported people congregate in front of their storefronts and some of the people experiencing homelessness would engage in illegal drug dealing and use. After holding several meetings with these businesses, working in conjunction with the department's District Community Liaison Officer (DCLO) for Central Division, the department's BCEO, and other city resources, the Office of Mayor Erin Mendenhall devoted additional city resources in the area so people experiencing homeleness could obtain an identification, help getting a job, clothes, and food. The collaborative work done by the SLCPD and Mayor's Office has helped improve the cleanliness of that area, and the department continues to receive positive feedback from business owners.

IMPACT AREA

BUSINESS COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT OFFICER

CONCEPT — PLANNING — EXECUTION — IMPLEMENTATION — MONITOR — COMPLETE

In April 2021, the SLCPD successfully launched its Business Community Engagement Officer (BCEO) position. This sworn member of law enforcement is assigned to the SLCPD's Central Division and reports to the Division Commander. The officer serves as a direct point of contact for business operators and owners.

All the BCEO's working hours are dedicated to building and maintaining relationships with downtown businesses and coordinating with the business community's law enforcement needs. When the BCEO is not contacting a business or in a community meeting, they will be doing property checks at local businesses that have expressed concerns. This position puts the detective out into the community on a regular basis. A recent example of the success of this program can be seen with the reduction of crime in the entertainment district along Pierpont Avenue in downtown. In early 2022, the area was inflicted with numerous incidents of violent crime including a stabbing, shooting and multiple aggravated assaults. After sitting down with the business owners in the area, SLCPD put together a collaborative and holistic plan to help mitigate the violent crime. The plan included hiring off-duty officers to block the road around midnight to keep cars from cruising up and down in front of the entertainment venues. Officers worked between the hours of 11 p.m. and 2 a.m. on Pierpont to increase the police presence. The business owners also took steps to mitigate crime and the potential for crime to occur. The work of the department and business owners has significantly reduced the number of issues the businesses on Pierpont Avenue have had to deal with.

Pending budget authorization, it is the intent of the department to expand the BCEO program to the Pioneer and Liberty patrol divisions as staffing and resources allow. This type of direct, business-to-police liaison has strengthened the department's relationship with its business community in the downtown core.

IMPACT AREA

CIVILIAN RESPONSE TEAM

CONCEPT — PLANNING — EXECUTION — IMPLEMENTATION — MONITOR — COMPLETE

As previewed in 2021, the SLCPD has made significant progress implementing a Civilian Response Team (CRT) to handle low-level calls for service. These low-level calls can be addressed either via telephone or by sending a police specialist instead of a sworn officer to handle the case. This system allows sworn officers to remain available for high priority calls for service. The intent of this program is to augment and enhance the current police response service within the city through diversity in response teams, like the current co-response model with social workers. Similar models across the country have shown great results to help divert those non-hazard, low-level calls for service from going out into the field.

In the FY23 budget, the City Council funded the creation of the Civilian Response Team consisting of 12 non-sworn responders and one Lieutenant to establish and oversee the program.

It is anticipated this program will be operational in spring 2023.

The CRT is intended to be a public safety response to low-hazard, non-emergency police related calls-for-service. This is a recommendation from the Matrix Operational Audit and has been funded by the city administration and legislative body.

The CRT will provide support by responding to telephonic case reports and select in-person requests during high call-volume times and days of the week. The CRT employees will typically not work with an officer – instead they will be developed as an independent response service that supports the police response. For example, the team may be used to block traffic and take reports on certain calls for service.

The CRT will be an added program to the SLCPD repertoire of services offered to SLC residents, businesses, and visitors.

Adding the formal leadership to the development team will be a critical component to a successful outcome.

The steering committee determined that the oversight must be a sworn position due to the complexity of the overlap of traditional police work with a new civilian response model. A sworn Lieutenant position will provide continuity, consistency, experience, and proven leadership with response operations within the city. The department has had success with this type of leadership model in the past.

The CRT is expected to be operational in spring 2023.

IMPACT AREA

TELEPHONIC CALLS FOR SERVICE

CONCEPT   PLANNING   EXECUTION   IMPLEMENTATION   MONITOR   COMPLETE

In October 2021, to divert additional low-level, non-hazard calls for response from the field, the department launched a program expanding our ability to take and process telephonic calls for service. This was necessary due to low staffing levels. The SLCPD is using overtime funding for this program and will explore requesting the appropriate budget to continue funding it. To sustain this responsiveness, additional and ongoing funding will need to be considered. Typically, the most common calls for service handled by phone include unwanted persons, citizen assist, and suspicious persons. Without this program, most, if not all, of those calls for service would have been dispatched to patrol officers out in the field and thereby keeping them held down on a call and unable to be out proactively patrolling or available for a high priority, in-progress emergency. Notably, the SLCPD has seen great improvement in the "Hold Times" for telephonic call for service, as outlined below.

CALLS HANDLED AND AVERAGE HOLD TIME FOR TELEPHONIC POLICE RESPONSE

Month	Calls Handled by Phone	Average Hold Time
October-21	428	0:57:22
November-21	693	0:43:32
December-21	928	0:14:12
January-22	665	0:19:49
February-22	942	0:31:09
March-22	1404	0:39:10
April-22	1708	0:41:14
May-22	1828	1:04:07
June-22	1480	1:29:19
July-22	1872	1:01:49
August-22	2303	0:56:30
September-22	1412	0:27:22

IMPACT AREA

CALL DIVERSION AND EXPANDING ONLINE REPORTING

CONCEPT — PLANNING — EXECUTION   IMPLEMENTATION   MONITOR   COMPLETE

The SLCPD recognizes how critical it is to provide an immediate response to all levels of calls of service. The department is in the process of exploring an automated process that will send text messages to the person calling 9-1-1, keeping them updated on the status of their call. This technology will be integrated into the department's computer assisted dispatch protocol and will give the department the ability to communicate any potential response delays. For example, if an officer responding to a lower priority call for service is diverted to a higher priority call, this new technology would inform the person of the situation and allow them the ability to file an online report, if applicable. This technology can allow the department to solicit feedback from the initial 9-1-1 caller.

The department continues to work with the executive leadership at SLC911, a separate city department, to implement policies and procedures related to expanding both call diversion and online reporting. It is the department's goal to explore technology and funding resources that will allow online reporting kiosks to be placed throughout the city. Recently, the SLCPD paired up with a local resource center and

PRIORITY 1-3 RESPONSE TIME AVERAGES OCTOBER 2021 – SEPTEMBER 2022

Last 12 Months	Oct-21	Nov-21	Dec-21	Jan-22	Feb-22	Mar-22	Apr-22	May-22	Jun-22	Jul-22	Aug-22	Sep-22
Priority 1 Average	0:14:16	0:12:58	0:10:46	0:10:13	0:10:25	0:10:53	0:11:58	0:10:46	0:12:41	0:11:27	0:11:27	0:10:24
Priority 2 Average	0:25:16	0:20:08	0:16:55	0:16:20	0:16:47	0:16:02	0:17:53	0:17:42	0:20:37	0:17:59	0:19:38	0:15:38
Priority 3 Average	1:19:07	0:50:59	0:35:47	0:32:37	0:37:18	0:36:27	0:42:28	0:46:30	1:06:41	0:58:05	1:00:20	0:42:10
Priority 1-3 Overall Average	0:52:34	0:35:44	0:26:15	0:24:30	0:27:21	0:26:37	0:30:30	0:32:16	0:43:54	0:38:33	0:40:33	0:29:08

September Only: 2021 vs 2022	Sep-21	Sep-22	Change
Priority 1	0:14:14	0:10:24	-0:03:50
Priority 2	0:24:13	0:15:38	-0:08:35
Priority 3	1:40:37	0:42:10	-0:58:27
Priority 1-3 Overall Average	1:02:36	0:29:08	-0:33:28

August 2022 vs September 2022	Aug-22	Sep-22	Change
Priority 1	0:11:27	0:10:24	-0:01:03
Priority 2	0:19:38	0:15:38	-0:03:59
Priority 3	1:00:20	0:42:10	-0:18:10
Priority 1-3 Overall Average	0:40:33	0:29:08	-0:11:25

established a crime reporting room within the center to allow users to file online reports, such as theft reports, because the department continuously saw an increase in calls for service at that location that did not need an in-person response. Because of the collaboration, which included outreach and training, calls for service at that location decreased by half. The department will increase its presence at resources centers with its Homeless Resource Center squad.

IMPACT AREA

SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
A STRATEGIC PLAN TO ADDRESS VIOLENT CRIME

INTRODUCTION

The attached addendum sets forth the department's strategic plan for reducing violent crime in the City's most violence-prone areas and among its most violence-prone offenders. To accomplish this, the department will implement and analyze evidence-based and problem-solving procedures that reduce crime and change the department's culture from being reactive to *proactive*.

The plan acknowledges that violent crime – as seen in other cities – is geographically concentrated to a relatively small number of places. For example, from June 2021 – June 2022, 12 addresses accounted for approximately 11% of the City's reported violent crime. Further, it is well known that a small proportion of offenders account for a large portion of criminal activity[1].

To address the criminal activity occurring within Salt Lake City, the SLCPD will utilize a well-established and researched model of hot-spots policing. Through this process, the Salt Lake City Police Department will increase police visibility at and around addresses where violent crime is concentrated. The hot-spots model utilizes the "problem analysis triangle." The triangle explains that crime occurs when a motivated offender and a victim (person) or target (place) come together at a particular time and place. For police, by removing one element of the triangle "systematically can prevent multiple crimes in the long term[2]."

The department will also focus on Problem-Oriented, Place-Based Policing. Where hot-spots policing is done in the short term, Problem-Oriented, Place-Based Policing is a mid-term solution that will have the department leading and coordinating with other city agencies to identify and improve the conditions that contribute to violent crime at crime-prone locations. As an example, the department's Pioneer Patrol Division identified an area prone to violent crime. A solution required better lighting to be installed. While the department has no ability to install or improve lighting conditions on its own, the division commander worked with the city to address this issue with the appropriate city department. As the department's violent crime reduction strategy continues to expand, the department, in conjunction with the mayor, will develop a working group of key stakeholders from local government to address crime and its causes at violence-prone places.

Finally, part of the department's longer-term strategy to reduce violence will involve a focused-deterrence model. This approach aims to change the behavior of high-risk offenders through a combination of deterrence, arrest, community involvement and the provision of alternatives to violence. This is a holistic, resource-intensive process involving multiple law enforcement and community partners, including federal law enforcement agencies and the United States Attorney's Office. Under this model, the department will continue its involvement in Project Safe Neighborhoods.

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1 Clark, R. V., and Eck J. (2005)
2 Santos and Santos (2022)

RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE SLCPD'S STRATEGIC PLAN TO ADDRESS VIOLENT CRIME

All three Salt Lake City Police patrol divisions have an identified focus area. In the three identified focus areas referenced below, SLCPD worked with the department's crime analysts to identify crime patterns and to increase police visibility at or near those locations to deter violent crimes.

- The Pioneer Patrol Division focus area border is from 200 North to South Temple and 700 West to 1000 West.

- The Central Patrol Division focus area border is from 200 South to 400 South and 200 West to South State Street.

- The Liberty Patrol Division focus area border is from 1300 South to 1500 South and 200 West to South State Street.

AUGUST 2021 TO AUGUST 2022 COMPARISON

- The Pioneer Patrol Division focus area saw 33% fewer violent crimes in August 2022 when compared to August 2021.

- The Central Patrol Division focus area saw 28% fewer violent crimes in August 2022 when compared to August 2021.

- The Liberty Patrol Division focus area saw 71% fewer violent crimes in August 2022 when compared to August 2021.

SEPTEMBER 2021 TO SEPTEMBER 2022 COMPARISON

- The Pioneer Patrol Division focus area saw 11% fewer property crimes in September 2022 when compared to September 2021.

- The Central Patrol Division focus area saw 18% fewer property crimes in September 2022 when compared to September 2021.

- The Liberty Patrol Division focus area saw 11% fewer property crimes in September 2022 when compared to September 2021.

CITY-WIDE VIOLENT CRIME
SEPTEMBER 2021 COMPARED TO SEPTEMBER 2022:

- Down 12.8%

CITY-WIDE PROPERTY CRIME
SEPTEMBER 2021 COMPARED TO SEPTEMBER 2022:

- Down 14.9%

RESPONSE TIMES:

September 2022: 10m:24s
September 2021: 14m:14s

August 2022 - Priority 1 - 11m:27s
September 2022 - Priority 1 - 10m:24s

Improvement: 01m:03s

Priority 1-3 Overall Average August 2022: 40m:33s
Priority 1-3 Overall Average September 2022: 29m:08s

Improvement: 11m:25s

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SEE NEXT PAGE FOR
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO
VIOLENT CRIME REDUCTION PLAN

Salt Lake City Police Department Violent Crime Reduction Plan

Michael R. Smith, J.D., Ph.D.
Rob Tillyer, Ph.D.
Brandon Tregle, J.D., Ph.D.

&

Mike Brown
Chief of Police

UTSA

The University of Texas at San Antonio

Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document sets forth Salt Lake City's strategic plan for reducing violent crime in the City's most violence-prone areas and among its most violence-prone offenders with the goal of reducing aggregate levels of reported violence City-wide. As of August 2022, violent crime in Salt Lake City has decreased by 3.6% year-to-date compared to the same period in 2021. However, when viewing crime statistics over a more extended period, violent street crime[1] increased approximately 20 percent over the past two years, driven primarily by an upsurge in aggravated assaults.

In Salt Lake City, as in most cities, violent crime is geographically concentrated to a relatively small number of places. The geographic concentration of violent crime in Salt Lake is consistent with a large body of literature describing urban crime, particularly violent crime, as a phenomenon primarily occurring in a few small geographic areas.

For example, from June 2021-June 2022, 12 addresses accounted for roughly 11% of the City's reported violent crime. Together, those addresses recorded eight or more crimes of violence apiece during this time period.

In any city, violent crime is caused by a combination of social, structural, and environmental conditions, many of which are outside the direct control of the police. As the social and economic fallout of the Covid 19 pandemic continues to put pressure on public services and the criminal justice system, policy-makers at the state and local levels must be cognizant of the role that well-intended policies can have on crime and violence. Long-term solutions to violent crime in Salt Lake City will require strategic policing *and* a commitment from policy-makers and the community to address the underlying conditions that contribute to violent victimization, including homelessness, urban blight, and decay. Thus, the successful execution of this plan will require active participation, cooperation, and investment by a wide-range of stakeholders in Salt Lake City, including City leadership, multiple city agencies and departments, federal and state government and law enforcement partners, community and faith-based organizations, non-profits, research partners, and community members themselves.

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1   As used here, violent street crime refers to the Part I violent offenses of murder/non-negligent manslaughter, aggravated assault, and robbery and does not include family violence-related offenses or sexual assaults.

A strategic plan to address rising violent crime is a necessary first step to reducing violence and victimization. Evidence from other cities that have successfully reduced violent crime shows the following factors as integral to success:

- Clear communication and reinforcement of this plan by the chief and SLCPD leadership team

- Buy-in and commitment from line officers to implement the strategies

- Engagement and support from City leaders

- A willingness to evaluate and modify current legal and social practices as needed to address the underlying challenges that facilitate and contribute to violent crime

- Alignment between all components of the criminal justice system

- Community support

- Consistent, honest, and ongoing evaluation of the implementation and impact of the plan

- Broad recognition that violent crime is a community problem and not only a police responsibility.

Hot Spots Policing

Drawing from a substantial body of research on the positive impacts hot spots policing can have on reducing violence, this plan begins with a short-term focus on substantially increasing police visibility at and around addresses where violent crime is concentrated and prioritizing street-level deterrence of potential offenders in these areas. The strategy is evidence-based and relies on increased police visibility rather than generalized "stop and frisk," zero tolerance policing, or other dragnet tactics. Based on crime analysis and mapping,

the SLCPD will assign officers to be highly visible at hot spot locations identified by crime analysis as the most violence-prone and at times when violence is most often reported. Pre-post implementation data on crime, arrests, and calls for service will be tracked at and around the targeted hot spots, and violence-prone locations will be reviewed and adjusted every 60-90 days.

Problem-Oriented, Place-Based Policing

In the mid-term, the SLCPD will lead and coordinate with other city agencies on a problem-oriented, place-based policing (POPBP) strategy designed to identify and ameliorate the underlying conditions that contribute to violent crime at crime-prone places. Place-based strategies addressing physical and social disorder are an effective, evidence-based approach to improve criminogenic conditions, reduce fear of crime, and encourage greater, pro-social use of public space. During the first six months of implementation, initial violent places will be identified using crime analysis and local police knowledge and intelligence.

A POPBP Board and working group made up of stakeholder government agencies (e.g., Building Inspections, Civil Enforcement, Youth & Family Services) will be used to design tailored, place-based strategies to address crime and its causes at violent places. Traditional police enforcement efforts (investigations and arrests) will be coupled with civil enforcement, nuisance abatement, environmental design changes, and disorder-focused efforts (graffiti abatement, trash clean up, abandoned vehicle removal, weed/brush removal) and other efforts to alter the criminogenic nature of the targeted places. Again, pre- and post-implementation data will be tracked in and around the targeted locations and adjustments made, if needed, to the strategy based on data trends. As crime declines in the targeted areas, new places will be identified and brought into the strategy.

Focused Deterrence

The longer-term strategy to reduce violence will involve implementation of a focused deterrence model in Salt Lake City. First designed and implemented in Boston in the 1990s, focused deterrence strategies have proven successful in reducing violent crime in several cities where they have been applied and evaluated. The goal of focused deterrence is to change the behavior of high-risk offenders through a combination of deterrence, arrest, community involvement, and the provision of alternatives to violence. A key feature of most successful focused deterrence strategies is the clear communication to gang members and other violent offenders of the risks associated with

continued criminal activity and the alternatives available to them under a robust suite of counseling/mental health, substance abuse, education, and job-related services made available to them within the strategy.


Focused deterrence is a holistic, resource-intensive process involving multiple law enforcement and community partners, including federal law enforcement agencies and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Initially, the SLCPD will work with research partners, city leadership, and other stakeholders to prioritize offenders for focused deterrence interventions. The nature of those interventions may vary according to the problems identified and at-risk populations implicated (gang violence vs. drug markets). The support and partnership of social service organizations, including city agencies, non-profits, and community-based leaders and groups, is necessary and will be sought. A careful evaluation of the implementation and impact of this strategy will be designed and carried out by academic partners at the University of Texas at San Antonio to facilitate modification and/or replication of the strategy to address additional at-risk populations as progress is made.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Salt Lake City is a mid-sized city and with a residential population of approximately 200,000, swelling to a nearly 400,000 daytime population. Moreover, visits to the urban core of Salt Lake City have surged to 155% of their level one year before the COVID-19 pandemic, and continued residential population growth is rapid (Semerad, 2022). Salt Lake City is served by a police department with a current strength of approximately 530 officers.[2] The Salt Lake City Police Department (SLCPD) is tasked with controlling violent crime while responding to calls for service, investigating property crimes, and providing for the overall safety of the citizens of Salt Lake City. SLCPD is committed to working with other city agencies and the community to reverse an increasing trend in violent crime over the past two years.

While violent crime has decreased in 2022 compared to 2021, overall street-level violent crime[3] in Salt Lake City has risen approximately 20 percent in 24 months from May 2020 through May 2022. May 2022, for example, saw 109 violent street crimes reported compared to 93 the previous May (see Figure 1 below).

FIGURE 1: OVERALL VIOLENT STREET CRIME TREND, JUL 2019-MAY 2022

NFV: Non-Family Violence

This increase suggests the need for a police-led, but community-wide response to tamping down violence and arresting and aggressively prosecuting violent offenders in the short term and a comprehensive set of public safety solutions in the longer term. To be effective,

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2   The SLCPD has an authorized strength of 593 officers and is short-staffed based on operational strength by about 24%. The department is actively trying to recruit and hire additional officers in a challenging police labor market.

3   Figure 1 below reflects Part 1 violent street crimes only - murder/non-negligent manslaughter, aggravated assault, robbery – and does not include family violence-related offenses or sexual assaults.

those solutions should address the social and physical disorder and fear of crime associated with an increasing homeless population living on the streets of Salt Lake City. Compelling research evidence suggests that reducing physical and social disorder will contribute to an overall reduction in crime in targeted places (Braga et al., 2019).

In Salt Lake City, as in most cities, violent crime is geographically concentrated in a relatively small number of places. During the past 12 months, just 12 of the most violence-prone addresses within the city accounted for roughly 11% of all reported violent street crime. This geographic concentration of violent crime is consistent with a large body of literature describing urban crime, particularly violent crime, as a phenomenon primarily occurring in a few small geographic areas or locations. Similarly, research indicates that a relatively small number of offenders (5%) account for the majority of violent crime. These two facts suggest that carefully-tailored, *place-based* and *offender-focused* strategies will be the most efficient and effective at reducing violent street crime. However, to be effective, they must be coupled with swift and certain prosecution, adjudication, and a functional correctional system (jails and prisons) to remove persistently violent people from the community and to deter others from continued violence. Addressing the underlying conditions that give rise to violent people and places is a long-term goal that will require community-wide commitment and resources.

In any city, violent crime is caused by a combination of social, structural, and environmental conditions, many of which are outside the direct control of the police. As the social and economic fallout of the Covid 19 pandemic continues to put pressure on public services and the criminal justice system, policy-makers at the state and local levels must be cognizant of the role that well-intended policies can have on crime and violence. The linkage between social and physical disorder and crime and fear of crime is well-established in the literature but may be moderated by collective efficacy[4] in neighborhoods and is strongly influenced by concentrated poverty (O'Shea, 2006; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Taylor et al., 1985; Wei et al., 2005; Yang, 2009). Violent crime, and especially robbery, as subset of violent crime, is directly correlated with levels of physical disorder (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Wei et al., 2005).

In Salt Lake City, evidence of homelessness and physical disorder is noticeable, and the homeless

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4   Collective efficacy refers to cohesion among neighborhood residents coupled with shared expectations of informal social control of public space.

concentrate in a number of encampments and around shelters, which are also hot spots for violent crime. Research suggests that the disorder conditions produced by large numbers of people living on the streets will have a reciprocal relationship with crime, violence, and fear of crime (Yang, 2009). Moreover, it is well understood that the homeless are victimized at rates that far exceed those of the non-homeless and are especially vulnerable to predatory violence (Ellsworth, 2018; Fitzpatrick et. al, 1993). While the police are a necessary component of violent crime reduction and prevention, they do not make policy, influence the amount or concentration of physical or social disorder, or control the factors that produce concentrated poverty. Long-term solutions to violent crime in Salt Lake City will require strategic policing *and* a commitment from policy-makers and the community to address the underlying conditions that contribute to violence, including urban blight and decay.

Finally, as criminal justice and bail reform efforts continue to gain traction throughout the nation, prosecutors and judges must be cognizant of how prosecution and bail decisions can impact violent crime by increasing the number of offenders who are not prosecuted or who are on pre-trial release, a portion of whom will commit additional crimes while on release pending trial.[5] Thus, the successful execution of this plan will require active participation, cooperation, and investment by a wide-range of stakeholders in Salt Lake City, including City leadership, multiple City agencies and departments, federal and state law enforcement partners, community and faith-based organizations, non-profits, research partners, and community members themselves.

Goals and Objectives

The SLCPD is committed to renewing its efforts to reducing violent crime in the city by developing this multi-faceted, violence reduction strategy based on the best available science. Drawing from a substantial body of research on the positive impacts that hot spots policing can have on reducing violence, this plan begins with a short-term focus on substantially increasing police visibility at locations where violent crime is concentrated and prioritizing street-level deterrence in these areas. Building outward, the plan incorporates a mid-term strategy focused on violent places within the city using a Problem-Oriented, Place-Based Policing (POPPB) approach. Finally, over the longer-term, the

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5   See Cassell & Fowles (2020) for a recent discussion of bail reform in Chicago and its impact on public safety.

SLCPD will lead a focused deterrence strategy to help break the cycle of violence among the small number of repeat and high-risk offenders who are responsible for committing most of the violent crime in Salt Lake City. All of these strategies are evidence-based, and all have shown success in other cities.

By implementing these strategies, the Salt Lake City Police Department seeks to accomplish the following goals:

- In partnership with other city agencies and the community, reverse the increasing trend in reported violent crime
- Reduce the annual number of victims of violent crime
- Increase community trust and engagement with the SLCPD to facilitate solving crimes of violence and successfully prosecuting violent offenders
- Improve place-based conditions that contribute to violence in coordination with other City stakeholders

Keys to Success

Violent crime reduction is unlikely to be successful without a clear strategy for success. The details of this plan are outlined below to ensure that all stakeholders understand the goals and the specific strategies to be applied in addressing the violent crime problem in Salt Lake City. The creation and adoption of a strategic crime reduction plan is a necessary but insufficient element to achieving the goal of reducing violent crime over the long-term. Several additional factors need to be present to enhance the likelihood of success:

- Clear communication and reinforcement of this plan by the chief and SLCPD leadership team

- Buy-in and commitment from line officers to implement the strategies

- Engagement and support from city leaders (i.e., Mayor and City Council) to include:

    o commitment of resources to support the plan

    o mobilization of city services to underpin aspects of the plan (i.e., the mid-term and long-term strategies)

- A willingness to evaluate and modify current legal and social practices as needed to address the underlying challenges that facilitate and contribute to violent crime

- Recognition that policy and practical alignment must exist between all components of the criminal justice system to ensure that the legal and corrections components of the system support the goals of the plan

- Community support to include businesses, faith-based leaders, neighborhood associations, and other professional organizations/communities (i.e., health, education, etc.)

- Consistent, honest evaluation of implementation and impact to facilitate modifications, as needed, to promote success

- Broad recognition that violent crime is a community problem that can be partially addressed by the SLCPD but cannot be fully addressed without action taken by the state, city, and community to tackle deep-rooted social problems (i.e., homelessness, employment opportunities, domestic violence, education, etc.)

NEAR-TERM STRATEGY

Hot Spots Policing

Considerable evidence suggests that police can be effective at reducing violent crime in small areas with high rates of violence. Often referred to as "hot spots policing," some of the strongest evidence of the impact that police can have on crime comes from more than 25 years of research showing that a relatively small number of areas generate the majority of violent crime in most American cities and that crime can be reduced in those areas through targeted police enforcement (Braga et al., 2019; National Research Council, 2004; Weisburd & Telep, 2014). Hot spots policing can be implemented fairly quickly and can reduce reported violent crime in targeted areas by 10-50 percent (Corsaro et al., 2019; Groff et al., 2015; Rosenfeld et al., 2014). Moreover, there is little evidence that violent crime is spatially displaced to surrounding areas when hot spots policing is implemented and considerable evidence that areas adjacent to hot spots also can expect lower crime rate benefits (albeit to a lesser degree) from the police treatment effects (Weisburd et al., 2006). Little is known, however, about the potential displacement of crime associated with hot spots policing to other areas of the city or to different crime types (Weisburd & Telep, 2014).

While there is no universally accepted definition of a "hot spot," hot spots often consist of street segments or similar small areas that are no more than a city block long and which extend no more than a half a block on either side of the segment, although many research studies have evaluated police interventions in larger hot spots (see Rosenfeld et al., 2014 – average hot spot contained 8 street segments and Groff et al., 2015 – average hot spot was the size of 22 football fields). The appropriate size of a hot spot should be driven by empirical considerations, such as the spatial distribution and density of crime, as well as considerations of geography and local police operational knowledge of street activity. In some cities, specific addresses may serve as appropriate hot spots for the concentration of police resources.

What police actually do in hot spots policing and whether some tactics are more effective than others have also been the subject of research and evaluation. In their most recent meta-analysis of hot spots research studies, Braga et al. (2019) found that problem-oriented policing strategies generated moderately higher impacts on crime than merely increasing police presence with extra officers or patrols. Problem-oriented policing refers to police strategies targeted at specific problems with solutions tailored to those problems (Goldstein, 1990). Hot spots dominated by illegal drug sales may require different policing

tactics than areas with high levels of illegal prostitution, for example. While some research has evaluated hot spot strategies targeted at specific types of violent crime (e.g. robberies or gun crimes), most hot spot strategies focused on violent crime seek to reduce all types of serious violent crimes.

A few studies have examined specific tactics and their effects on crime at hot spots. Recently, Corsaro et al. (2019) investigated whether foot patrols or stationary marked police vehicles with emergency lights illuminated had a greater impact on crime and calls for service within hot spots. They found that lighted patrol cars reduced violent crime in hot spots while foot patrols had the greatest impact on property crime. Groff et al. (2015) compared foot patrol, problem-oriented policing, and offender-focused tactics within experimental and control hot spots and found that only offender-focused tactics had an impact on violent crime. The experimental hot spots showed a 42% decrease in all violent crimes and a 50% decrease in violent felonies compared to their controls. Importantly, modern hot spot strategies rely on increased police visibility and intelligence-led offender targeting rather than generalized "stop and frisk," oversaturation, or dragnet tactics that can lead to mistrust of the police and community resentment.

Offender-focused police strategies are based in an intelligence-led policing framework and derive from the empirical premise that a small percentage of offenders are responsible for most crime (Clarke & Eck, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2008). By proactively targeting repeat offenders, police can theoretically have a greater impact on crime than by targeting places alone (National Research Council, 2004). This strategy has the added benefit of leaving a smaller

police "footprint" within communities by focusing attention on known repeat offenders rather than all persons who happen to be out on the street. Offender-focused policing requires good intelligence on where repeat offenders live and/ or where they are likely to engage in future crime. In the Groff et al. (2015) study, the Philadelphia Police Department employed dedicated teams of officers who were exempt from answering calls for service and who proactively contacted, questioned, stopped, and arrested known offenders in the experimental hot spots.

Hot spots policing has become a well-accepted strategy to address crime in urban areas, which is disproportionately found in micro-areas with high rates of crime. In a recent nationally representative survey of U.S. law enforcement agencies, the National Police

Research Platform found that 75% of agencies surveyed employed hot spots policing as a crime control strategy. Braga et al.'s (2019) most recent updated meta-analysis of hot spots policing studies reviewed 78 tests of hot spots policing across 65 eligible studies and found noteworthy crime control gains in 62 of the 78 tests reviewed. Problem-oriented strategies focused on changing the characteristics of crime-prone places were moderately more effective than increasing police presence or traditional enforcement activities (Braga et al., 2019), and recent evidence suggests that a hot spots approach focused on repeat offenders is potentially even more effective than other place-based problem-oriented approaches (Groff et al., 2015).

That said, evidence is lacking that hot spots policing as it has been implemented and evaluated in most cities to date can effectively reduce crime in an *entire* city or within larger sections of cities (Sherman et al., 2014; Weisburd et al., 2017; Weisburd & Telep, 2014). For example, in an evaluation conducted in Dallas 10 years ago, Weisburd et al. (2015) found measurable reductions in crime within treatment hot spots that experienced increases in patrol time, but these reductions were not measurable within the larger geographic patrol beats where the treatment hot spots were located. Because the experiment resulted in only a 2% increase in unallocated patrol time to hot spots, Weisburd et al. (2015) theorized that the patrol dosage level was insufficient to produce large enough crime reductions gains that might have been observed at the beat level. Based on the observed levels of crime reduction in hot spots associated with the 2% increase in unallocated patrol time, Weisburd et al. (2015) estimated that if unallocated patrol time could have been increased to 25%, then crime could theoretically have been reduced by as much as 25% within the treatment *beats*. In a subsequent experimental simulation, Weisburd et al. (2017) demonstrated a hypothetical 13% reduction in street robberies within a large police *borough* when one third of patrol officers were assigned to spend 50 percent of their time at the top five hot spots within their beats and a 21% reduction in robberies when half of patrol officers spent *all* of their time at the top five hot spots.

Taken together, the hot spots policing literature suggests several key factors that might produce optimal crime control within hot spots and possibly within larger areas surrounding those hot spots or even across an entire city (Weisburd et al., 2017):

- Hot spots must receive enough "dosage" to produce measurable crime control gains beyond the boundaries of the hot spots themselves
  - Dosage reflects both the number of hot spots that receive intervention, *and* the amount of time police devote to each hot spot
  - Concentrating available patrol resources on hot spots may result in fewer officers assigned to lower crime areas and longer response times, especially for non-emergency calls
- Police activities at hot spots matter
  - High-visibility presence (marked cars with lights on) and offender-focused tactics may be more effective than foot or drive-by patrols at reducing violent crime

- Police behavior matters
  - When police focus on procedural justice and are viewed as legitimate by the public, crime control gains are likely to be enhanced (Tyler et al., 2015)

Hot Spots Policing in Salt Lake City

Criminologists from the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA research partners) have evaluated the geographic concentration of crime in Salt Lake City and have found that violent crime is highly concentrated at a relatively small number of addresses in the city. Violence-prone locations in Salt Lake City include certain stores, hotels, homeless shelters, convenience stores, and apartment complexes. With this in mind, the SLCPD will employ a hot spots policing strategy that initially focuses on violence-prone *addresses* and which increases police visibility at or near those locations to deter violent offenders.

First, working with UTSA researchers, SLCPD will update the locations of violent crime hot spots throughout the city by focusing on addresses where robberies, aggravated assaults, and homicides occurred over the past 12 months and within the most recent 60-90-day period to ensure that hot spots are appropriately identified. Initially, this empirically-driven analysis will seek to identify the small percentage of addresses where violent crime is most heavily concentrated (Weisburd et al., 2015). Once these addresses are identified, they will be rank ordered from highest to lowest city-wide and within police divisions. It is expected that some divisions may have few or even no high crime addresses while others may have multiple high crime hot spots. Depending upon available resources, SLCPD will seek to treat as many violence-prone addresses as possible with a goal of treating, at minimum, those addresses that together account for at least 10% of all violent crime in the City. Hot spot locations will be adjusted (if needed) every 60-90 days based on changing crime patterns, and police resources will be re-deployed accordingly.

Second, once identified and rank-ordered within divisions, the high violent crime addresses will be evaluated by SLCPD commanders and their officers and hot spot boundaries adjusted, if appropriate, based on unique geographic features (e.g., a mall or shopping center) and local operational knowledge of crime patterns and trends. The list of current hot spots that emerges from this process will be mapped, revisited, and updated every 60-90 days.

Finally, the hot spots will receive a high visibility "treatment" consisting of the systematic assignment of patrol officers to remain in the hot spots with their emergency lights activated for 15 minutes (the optimal dosage period) every hour during peak hours of crime as identified in each hot spot through crime analysis.[6] Strong evidence exists that hot spots policing reduces crime in targeted micro-areas, and all available resources will be brought to bear in an effort to drive down violent crime in sectors and city-wide by concentrating sufficient dosage in the targeted violent crime hot spots identified through the process described above.

Implementation of the strategy is expected to begin in September 2022, and impacts will be assessed every 90 days as described below. Adjustments to the hot spot boundaries and/or re-deployment of officers to new hot spots will be made every 90 days if needed based on changes in observed crime patterns.

Measurement and Evaluation

To assess the impact and effectiveness of the near-term hot spots policing strategy, reported violent crime counts, arrests, and calls for service data will be obtained for the treated hot spots, police divisions, and city-wide for 24-36 months leading up to the implementation of the strategy and monthly thereafter. Violent crime counts also will be obtained and evaluated for catchment areas surrounding the hot spots to check for crime displacement or diffusion of benefits resulting from the intervention. Violent crime counts will be reviewed descriptively at each of the four levels (hot spots, catchment areas, divisions, city-wide) on a monthly basis and patterns or changes assessed. At 60-90-day intervals, changes to crime and the other metrics will be evaluated and compared to the previous 60-90-day period. Quarterly reports will be prepared and disseminated internally within the SLCPD and externally to city council and other stakeholders as appropriate. Semi-annually, broader and more detailed analyses will be conducted by the UTSA research team to evaluate impacts of the strategy on violent crime, arrests, and calls for service within the hot spots, catchment areas, divisions, and city-wide. These analyses also will include an assessment of plan implementation and fidelity to ensure officers are present at the hot spots in accordance with the deployment plans (peak crime hours/days of the week). When emerging hot spots are identified, they will be added to the treatment protocols; likewise, hot spots that are no longer "hot" will be removed.

Every six months, the Chief of Police will lead an intensive strategic review to assess the effectiveness of the strategy and to recommend any changes or adjustments. The possible addition of place-focused, problem-oriented strategies also will be evaluated during the strategic review sessions. To facilitate transparency and stakeholder input, biannual reports will be produced for public release outlining the hot spots strategy, detailing observed changes in violent crime, and noting any changes recommended to the strategy.

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6   As in Las Vegas (see Corsaro et al., 2019) and Dallas, patrol officers will be assigned to these high visibility hot spot times each hour via dispatch. This will help ensure fidelity to the strategy. If resources or unforeseen events do not allow for the assignment of officers to hot spots during certain hours, these gaps will be documented and accounted for in the ongoing evaluation of the efficacy of the strategy.

MID-TERM STRATEGY

Problem-Oriented, Place-Based Policing (POPBP)

A robust body of literature has documented the effectiveness of hot spots policing at reducing crime in targeted areas. A recent meta-analysis of this research found that problem-oriented strategies carefully tailored to address the underlying conditions that contribute to recurring problems in crime-prone locations were more effective at reducing crime than merely increasing or intensifying traditional police activities (Braga et al., 2019). Moreover, a variety of problem-oriented, place-based strategies have been implemented and evaluated and have shown success at reducing a broad range of offenses from property crimes like burglary or theft to drug-related crimes and violent crime (Braga & Bond, 2008; Eck & Spelman, 1987; Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008; Hinkle et al., 2020; Taylor et al., 2011).

While place-based crime reduction strategies often have a law enforcement component, they frequently require the involvement of other stakeholders who can help address the conditions that make a particular location attractive for crime. Routine activities theory suggests that three elements must come together in time and space for a crime to occur: A vulnerable victim, a motivated offender, and the lack of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979). A recent Campbell Collaboration systematic review of 28 studies that examined the effects of reducing physical (vacant lots, trash, graffiti, etc.) and social (public drinking/drug use, prostitution, loitering, etc.) disorder on crime found that 26 of the 30 effects tests reported statistically significant crime reduction impacts in the targeted areas associated with the problem-oriented, disorder abatement strategies utilized (Braga et al., 2019).

Thus, problem-oriented, place-based crime prevention strategies seek to remove one or more of the necessary pre-conditions to crime to prevent victimization and reduce the likelihood that crime will reoccur at a targeted location. Reducing social and physical disorder can be a powerful deterrent to would-be offenders and stimulate guardianship through the increased, pro-social use of space.

As noted, place-based crime prevention often requires a multidimensional response to a set of underlying conditions that make a particular place amenable to crime. City services are often needed to address social and physical disorder that contribute to fear of crime and that reduce the use of public space. Reducing homelessness, open-air drug use, litter, poor lighting, code violations, or aggressive panhandling requires resources and involvement

by city, county and state agencies, non-profits, or even volunteers. Likewise, a formal assessment and the application of principles of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) may be needed to improve natural surveillance and guardianship of businesses, streets, or public parks where violent crime occurs.

Problem-driven solutions may involve improved lighting, the removal or installation (depending upon conditions) of barriers to vehicular or foot traffic, the enforcement or adoption of building or zoning regulations, nuisance/disorder abatement, or traditional law enforcement measures such as conducting investigations and arresting or issuing citations to law violators. Above all, creative thinking, multi-disciplinary approaches, and appropriate resources are necessary to design and implement situational crime prevention strategies to reduce the incidence of violence at places where it is concentrated.

Urban Blight and Disorder Abatement

Rooted in "broken windows" theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), a growing body of literature has documented the association between urban blight and crime, including violent crime (Kondo et al., 2015; Branas et al., 2016; Branas et al., 2018; Connealy, 2022; Wheeler et al., 2018). Efforts in Philadelphia and Buffalo to remediate vacant lots and/or abandoned or neglected buildings led to measurable reductions in firearms assaults and other crimes in and around the treated areas compared to comparable untreated areas (Branas et al., 2016; Wheeler et al., 2018). In a follow-up study using a randomized controlled trial design (the "gold standard" in research design to show cause and effect), Branas and his colleagues (2018) obtained funding to randomly assign vacant lots in Philadelphia for treatment through the application of a vacant land ordinance that allowed city-contracted workers to remove trash and debris, grade the land, plant a small number of trees, hydroseed the lot with grass, and install a low wooden fence with gaps to encourage use of the lots as micro parks within neighborhoods. Approximately 375 lots were randomly assigned and treated (some more extensively than others) at an average cost of $5 per square meter and maintained afterwards at an average cost of $.50 per square meter. The researchers measured crime and neighborhood perceptions of crime in and around the treated sites and found significantly reduced perceptions of crime through surveys of residents and a statistically significant reduction in all reported crime (-4.2%), gun assaults (-2.7%), and burglaries (-6.3%) in the treated areas compared to the untreated areas; the effects were even more pronounced in neighborhoods below the poverty line. Kondo et al. (2015) found similar effects associated with the installation of working doors and windows to improve the facades of abandoned buildings, and recently, Connealy (2022) also demonstrated the salience of urban decay (deteriorated streets and sidewalks, dilapidated buildings, vacant/ unkempt land) on the formation and persistence of crime hot spots in Indianapolis. Taken as a whole, this body of evidence suggests that place-based strategies to control crime should include efforts to remediate urban decay, particularly in and around hot spots for violent crime.

POPBP in Salt Lake City

Violent crime in Salt Lake City is highly concentrated at a relatively small number of addresses, and many of the places where violent crime repeatedly occurs are businesses or homeless shelters. Some motels, convenience stores, gas stations, and small number of apartment complexes also disproportionately contribute to violent crime in Salt Lake City.

Thus, the existing pattern of violent crime in Salt Lake City suggests the need for a place-based strategy that would involve partnerships between businesses (including apartment/motel management), the SLCPD, and other city agencies to address the conditions in and around these locations that make them attractive targets for violent crime. A holistic, problem-oriented response to such conditions will require detailed problem definitions, tailored, evidence-based solutions, and the careful assessment of results (Goldstein, 1990).

As a promising mid-term strategy to address violence, the SLCPD, in coordination with other city agencies and stakeholders, intends to implement a POPBP process in Salt Lake City to complement the hot spots strategies it will implement in the shorter term. Realistically, a POPBP strategy will take 6-12 months to put into place and will require training and buy-in from multiple stakeholders. The following table was adapted from Herold et al. (2020) and serves to illustrate how the POPBP process will unfold in Salt Lake City.

TABLE 1: The POPBP Process

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS
Select violent locations
Select and train SLCPD POPBP unit
Establish, train, and obtain buy-in from POPBP Board members
Establish and train POPBP working group
POPBP working group assesses the nature and extent of the problem(s) • Collect community intelligence • Gather and analyze agency-specific data
Develop solutions to problem(s) identified; present to POPBP Board • Enforcement solutions • Environmental solutions • Community solutions
Implement solutions
Assess implementation and effectiveness
Make adjustments as needed • Continual assessment

To maximize its chances for success, the POPBP process requires buy-in from multiple stakeholders and a careful, data-driven process that starts with identifying violence-prone hot spots and investigating them exhaustively to understand the nature of the problems

that contribute to the violence occurring at these locations. Police and other POPBP stakeholders will require training on the POPBP process and/or investigative techniques, and the police must have (or put in place) a functional process for collecting and analyzing data and intelligence related to potential POPBP sites.

Once likely sites have been identified, Chief Brown, working with the Mayor, will lead the development of a POPBP Board (stakeholder agency leaders) and working group (mid-level managers) to oversee the implementation of place-based operations plans. The working group will be responsible for gathering information about the violence-prone places, carefully defining the problems there, and developing creative solutions. The POPBP Board will review the information gathered and proposed solutions, approve the place-based plans, and commit the resources necessary to carry them out. The careful tracking and analysis of pre- and post-intervention metrics (agreed upon by the Board) is vital and will be carried out by the UTSA research partners. The effects of the interventions must be carefully assessed and documented and adjustments made to the plans if necessary to optimize success. Critically, the plans must include a strong maintenance component purposely designed to ensure that crime reduction gains are maintained and not squandered as attention is shifted to other sites (Herold et al., 2020).

During the first six months of implementation, initial violent places will be identified by the SLCPD POPBP unit using traditional crime analysis methods and local police knowledge and intelligence. The process of putting together the POPBP board will begin concurrently, and the initial training of police POPBP personnel will take place during the initial six-month period. The Chief of Police will lead the POPBP Board and will be principally responsible for constituting the Board with support from the Mayor. Once the Board is in place, its members and working group designees will be trained on the POPBP process and goals within six months. Likely membership of the Board will include the following:

TABLE 2: Initial POPBP Board Membership

CITY DEPARTMENT	ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Police	- Lead POPBP board - Gather intelligence - Conduct criminal investigations - Make arrests - Deter criminal activity - Analyze crime and public-safety related data
City Attorney	- Legal review of recommended intervention strategies as needed - Drafts municipal code changes as needed
Building Services	- Building inspections - Code compliance - Civil enforcement

Civil Enforcement	• Enforcement (zoning, weeds, etc.) • Vacant/boarded housing
Community & Neighborhoods	• Housing solutions • Community problem-solving
Compliance	• Impoundment of abandoned vehicles • Parking issues
Economic Development	• Business investment/development
Fire Department	• Identify/address fire hazards and fire code violations
Housing Stability	• Housing programs • Provision of services/shelter • Impact and needs assessments
Planning	• Zoning-related issues
Public Lands	• Parks and recreation • Use and maintenance
Redevelopment Agency	• Livability • Neighborhood improvement
Streets	• Street improvements • Street design
Transportation	• Public transportation • Traffic problems/concerns
Waste & Recycling	• Illegal dumping • Trash removal
Youth & Family	• Youth programs • Summer jobs • Family support

Once the POPBP board and working group are in place and trained, the SLCPD POPBP unit and POPBP working group will begin an intensive information-gathering process on the sites to identify the precise nature and scope of the underlying problems driving violent crime in and around them. This information-gathering and analysis phase will culminate in the development of potential solutions to the problems identified. Problems identified and solutions proposed will be incorporated into site-specific operations plans that will include timelines for implementation, responsible parties, and metrics for measuring implementation and effectiveness of each proposed solution. These strategies likely will involve traditional police enforcement and crime prevention activities but also should include a multipronged and multi-disciplinary strategy to address the underlying problems that facilitate violence at the crime-prone place. Changes to the physical environment, code enforcement, and even traffic flows may need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive place-based violence reduction strategy. Once operations plans have been developed, they will be presented to the POPBP board for its input, eventual approval, and commitment of resources.

Measurement and Evaluation

To assess the implementation and effectiveness of the POPBP strategy on violent crime in Salt Lake City, the UTSA research team will conduct a process and impact evaluation of the strategy. Process evaluations are designed to document the implementation of programs and policies, assess whether they were implemented as intended, and identify any obstacles to implementation. An outcome (or impact) evaluation focuses on whether the program or strategy as implemented had its intended effect. In this case, the overarching goal of the strategy is to reduce violent crime (robberies, aggravated assaults, homicides) and its associated metrics such as shootings or violence-related calls for service in and around crime-prone places. The process evaluation will make use of problem-specific metrics to assess expected outcomes such as arrests made, code violations written, nuisances abated, or environmental changes made to document implementation. The POPBP working group will be asked for input on implementation metrics that should be tracked, and these will be systematically gathered and analyzed by the UTSA research team and reported semi-annually following POPBP implementation.

On the outcome side, the POPBP working group will again work with the UTSA researchers to identify appropriate effectiveness metrics such as violent crimes, shootings, or violence-related calls for service received pre- and post-intervention. A 6-month pre and 6-month post intervention period will be utilized initially to gauge the impact of the strategy on the agreed-upon impact metrics collected in and around the crime-place locations and surrounding areas. Once maintenance plans are put in place to maintain crime reduction gains at targeted sites, the SLCPD and UTSA researchers will continue to follow key outcome metrics over time (e.g., 24-36 months) to track long-term effects.

LONG-TERM STRATEGY

Longer-term crime reduction strategies require additional time and resources to implement compared to short-term or mid-term strategies. In most cases, they also require collaboration with outside stakeholders, which may include other city departments, federal law enforcement agencies, schools, businesses, community groups, and non-profit organizations. The long-term violence reduction strategy proposed below is evidence-based and has proven successful in other cities after rigorous evaluation.

Focused Deterrence

First designed and implemented in Boston in the 1990s, focused deterrence strategies (sometimes referred to as "pulling levers") have proven successful in reducing violent crime in a number of cities where they have been applied and evaluated (Braga et al., 2018; Corsaro, 2018; Engel, 2018). A leading expert in the design and evaluation of these approaches to reducing street-level violence has stated unequivocally that "focused deterrence strategies save lives" (Engel, 2018). The goal of focused deterrence is to change the behavior of high-

risk offenders through a combination of deterrence, incapacitation (arrest), community involvement, and the provision of alternatives to violence (Braga et al., 2018). A key feature of most focused deterrence strategies is the clear communication to gang members and other violent offenders of the risks associated with continued criminal activity and the alternatives available to them under a robust suite of social service, education, and job-related services made available to them under the strategy. Focused deterrence strategies have been successfully implemented in cities such as Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Chicago, New Orleans, Oakland, Detroit, and Seattle among others and have shown statistically significant, and in some cases, substantively large reductions (15-34%) in reported violent crime (McGarrell et al., 2006; Engel et al., 2010; Papachristos & Kirk, 2015; Corsaro & Engel, 2015; Saunders et al., 2016).

Components of Focused Deterrence

While focused deterrence strategies typically contain common elements, they should be viewed as problem-oriented policing strategies that work best when tailored to a specific crime problem or offending population (e.g., gang violence, youth homicide) in a city or area of a city. These strategies emphasize the development of an interagency law enforcement team often consisting of local, state, and federal partners (law enforcement, prosecutors, probation/parole, etc.), which relies on local intelligence to identify high risk offenders or groups of offenders within the targeted risk group. The law enforcement team then develops a strategy to target the offenders utilizing <u>all</u> available legal remedies – arrest and prosecution (often with federal partners taking the lead on drug and gun-related crimes), gang injunctions, place-based strategies to close down buildings or houses used to facilitate crime, etc. Key to the strategy is (1) a deterrence message communicated directly and repeatedly to the target population, and (2) offering violent lifestyle alternatives to the targeted offenders, which may involve the provision of social services, education, job training, substance abuse treatment, or direct employment with willing partners in the private or non-profit sectors (Braga, 2018).

The deterrence message is often communicated through "call-ins" or offender notification meetings whereby offenders are invited or required (as a condition of probation or parole) to appear and hear deterrence messaging from law enforcement officials and respected community voices (e.g., clergy or family members of victims). At these meetings, social service representatives are also available to offer prosocial alternatives to the threat posed by law enforcement of arrest and long-term incarceration in a federal penitentiary. Cities that have used focused deterrence strategies successfully sometimes have made use of street workers (often former gang members) to communicate the deterrence message directly to gang members on the street and to serve as a resource to connect them with social services (CICF, 2021; Engel et al., 2010; McGarrell, et al., 2006). Each offender also should be assigned to a caseworker for follow-up and tracking from initial contact through final disposition.

Focused deterrence strategies come in several varieties. The original Boston Ceasefire model, later replicated and modified in Cincinnati and other cities, focused on gangs and violent criminal groups. Other cities have copied the High Point, NC drug market intervention (DMI) program that focused on identifying and arresting violent drug dealers while suspending criminal proceedings against non-violent drug offenders within targeted drug markets (Kennedy & Wong, 2009). These non-violent offenders were then provided moral support and encouragement from family members and/or community leaders and social service support from city or non-profit agencies. Based on the High Point experience, DMI has been rated as "effective" by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ, 2014). A final type of focused deterrence targets repeat offenders by leveraging available legal tools (arrest and prosecution), deterrence through the use of "moral" voices from the community, and the provision of social service alternatives (Braga, 2018; Papachristos et al., 2007).

Focused Deterrence in Salt Lake City

As part of its strategy to help provide long-term solutions to violent crime in Salt Lake City, the SLCPD will lead problem-based, focused deterrence strategies tailored to particular violent crime problems, neighborhoods, and offender groups. In partnership with the UTSA research team, the SLCPD will utilize problem-oriented policing methods to clearly identify underlying violent crime patterns in Salt Lake City and its neighborhoods,[7] and then it will design tailored strategies to address those problems drawn from the success of focused deterrence models in other cities.

Focused deterrence is a holistic, resource-intensive process involving multiple law enforcement and community partners. Initially, the SLCPD will work with its academic partners, city leadership, and other stakeholders to prioritize problems and people for focused deterrence interventions. The nature of those interventions may vary according to the problem identified (gang violence vs. neighborhood-based open-air drug markets), recognizing that some problems may overlap. As studies that have documented success have found, law enforcement partners at the local, state, and federal level will be engaged and brought onboard early in the process. These partners may include the FBI, U.S. Attorney's Office, DEA, ATF, Salt Lake County District Attorney, Utah Adult Probation & Parole, and others.

Given the resource-intensive nature of focused deterrence, initially one problem and/or neighborhood will be selected for intervention. High risk offenders will be identified from a combination of arrest data and criminal intelligence maintained by SLCPD and/or federal law enforcement. The initial plan will be drawn-up as outlined above, and it will be continually assessed as part of the evaluation process once enacted. If resources allow, a second (or even third) focused deterrence effort may be undertaken simultaneously based on the emerging evidence and lessons learned from the first.

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7   Neighborhoods may be defined in the traditional sense using historically understood neighborhood boundaries (e.g., Sugarhouse, University/Foothill, the Avenues) or it may focus on troublesome housing

Engaging in the SARA[8] problem-oriented process and laying the groundwork for the partnerships needed to ensure programmatic success will take 6-12 months from the time implementation of the strategy begins. It is anticipated that the actual implementation of a focused deterrence strategy likely will begin in the latter half of 2023 or early 2024. By that time, the impact of the short and mid-term strategies that are part of SLCPD's overall violence reduction strategic plan will have been measured and felt. The impact of these shorter-term strategies may affect the crime problems identified and chosen for intervention using a focused deterrence approach. In this way, the long-term focused deterrence strategy will build upon the expected success of the earlier components of the overall violent crime reduction plan, and the components will work synergistically to reduce violent crime in Salt Lake City and lay the groundwork for long-term change.

The resources needed to successfully implement focused deterrence are considerable. Most cities that have utilized this approach have hired (or assigned) a full-time, senior-level director to oversee implementation of the strategy. Service providers must be identified, funding secured, and contracts or memoranda of understanding drawn up and signed. The cooperation of federal partners must be obtained and criteria established for federal prosecution when needed. The support of community and faith-based leaders, victim or survivor groups, family members, and other "moral voices" from the community will be necessary. Cooperation from other elements of the criminal justice system, especially the Salt Lake County prosecutor, is vital for success. In planning for the implementation of focused deterrence, the SLCPD chief and other city leaders may consider the development of a strategy to identify philanthropic partners who may be willing to help underwrite the initial and ongoing costs of the initiative and its evaluation. In sum, the time and effort needed to manage an effort of this magnitude requires a capable leader and appropriate staff (both police and non-police) to support and sustain the initiative for several years until processes are routinized and long-term impacts are felt.

Measurement and Evaluation

A scientifically valid process and impact evaluation of the Salt Lake City focused deterrence strategy is essential for measuring and documenting programmatic successes and failures. The UTSA research team will be engaged to conduct an independent evaluation of the strategy. An evaluation of this magnitude will be a considerable investment, but it is critical to know if the strategy was implemented as intended and had the impact it was intended to achieve. Before-and-after measures of crime, calls for service, quality of life, and community perceptions of safety will be key outcome indicators the UTSA team will consider. Carefully documenting the fidelity with which the strategy is implemented is also important and necessary to produce a "lessons learned" document that can serve as an implementation guide for subsequent iterations of the strategy.

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8   Scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (Goldstein, 1990).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This document serves as the Violent Crime Reduction Strategic Plan for Salt Lake City and the Salt Lake City Police Department. It contains evidence-based short, mid, and long-term strategies to address violence and its underlying conditions in Salt Lake City over the next three years.

In the short-term, the SLCPD will execute a hot spots policing strategy to significantly increase police visibility in violent crime hot spots and deter violent offenders. As a mid-term strategy, the SLCPD will coordinate and lead a problem-oriented, place-based policing strategy to identify crime-prone places, arrest offenders when needed, and address the underlying environmental conditions conducive to crime. Long-term, the SLCPD will lead a focused deterrence strategy to arrest and prosecute violent offenders, deter others from committing violent crimes, and facilitate the provision of social services to crime-prone individuals willing to take advantage of them. From short-term to long-term, the SLCPD is also committed to facilitating the scientific evaluation of these strategies by credible and independent evaluators to document programmatic successes or failures and to provide a roadmap for future leaders in Salt Lake City and beyond to follow in their continuing efforts to reduce violence and the toll it takes on individuals and families in the community.

These strategies are evidence-based and purposely designed to work synergistically to lower violent crime and improve the environmental conditions that facilitate it, recognizing that lowering poverty, improving education, reducing unemployment, eliminating homelessness and food insecurity, and supporting families are also critical to reducing violence in communities in the long term.

TPD Crime Plan Timeline: Year 1 (Sep 2022-Aug 2023)

TASKS	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Hot Spots Policing												
Allocate resources based on recent analyses	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X
Evaluate treatment effectiveness		X						X			X	
Modify treatment application as necessary			X		X	X		X	X			X
Prepare interim report on treatment effectiveness			X			X		X	X			X
Prepare comprehensive report on longer term trends and patterns						X						X
Problem-Oriented, Place-Based Policing (POPBP)												
Select and train TPD POPBP unit						X						
Establish and train POPBP board and working group							X	X				
Gather pre-intelligence to select violent micro-locations							X					
Conduct internal and stakeholder information-gathering sessions								X	X			
Present POPBP plan to Board for approval										X		
Execute strategy										X	X	
Evaluate effectiveness; adjust; add new sites											X	X
Prepare summary report												
Focused Deterrence												
Convene program stakeholders												
Establish and train program board												
Program planning												
Identify at-risk offenders & locations												
Conduct offender call-in meetings												

TPD Crime Plan Timeline: Year 2 (Sep 2023-Aug 2024)

TASKS / MONTH	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Hot Spots Policing												
Intensive enforcement/people & places												
Monitor implementation												
Prepare summary report on outcomes												
Allocate resources based on recent analyses	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Evaluate treatment effectiveness		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Modify treatment application as necessary			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Prepare interim report on treatment effectiveness			X	X		X			X			X
Prepare comprehensive report on longer term trends and patterns						X						X
Problem-Oriented, Place-Based Policing (POPBP)												
Select and train TPD POPBP unit												
Establish and train POPBP board and working group												
Gather pre-intelligence to select violent micro-locations	X	X	X									
Conduct internal and stakeholder information-gathering sessions		X	X									
Present POPBP plan to Board for approval				X								
Execute strategy				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Evaluate effectiveness; adjust; add new sites				X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Prepare summary report				X						X		
Focused Deterrence												
Convene program stakeholders					X							
Establish and train program stakeholders				X	X	X						
Program planning					X	X						

TPD Crime Plan Timeline: Year 3 (Sep 2024-Aug 2025)

Program	TASKS	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
MONTH													
	Identify at-risk offenders & locations				X	X							
	Conduct offender call-in meetings							X			X		
	Intensive enforcement/people & places							X	X	X	X	X	X
	Monitor implementation								X	X	X	X	X
	Prepare summary report on outcomes												
	Prepare comprehensive report												X
Hot Spots Policing	Allocate resources based on recent analyses	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Evaluate treatment effectiveness		X			X			X			X	
	Modify treatment application as necessary			X		X	X		X	X			X
	Prepare interim report on treatment effectiveness			X	X	X	X			X			X
	Prepare comprehensive report on longer term trends and patterns						X						X
Problem-Oriented, Place-Based Policing (POPBP)	Select and train TPD POPBP unit												
	Establish and train POPBP board and working group												
	Gather pre-intelligence to select violent micro-locations	X											
	Conduct internal and stakeholder information-gathering sessions		X	X									
	Present POPBP plan to Board for approval				X								
	Execute strategy					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Evaluate effectiveness; adjust; add new sites		X	X	X						X		X
	Prepare summary report												X

Focused Deterrence

Task	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Convene program stakeholders								
Establish and train program board								
Program planning								
Identify at-risk offenders & locations								
Conduct offender call-in meetings	X			X		X		X
Intensive enforcement/people & places	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Monitor implementation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Prepare summary report on outcomes	X							X
Prepare comprehensive report						X	X	X

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